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Abstract Badcock and Crespi have advanced the hypothesis that autism and
schizophrenia are caused by imbalanced imprinting in the brain. They argue that an
imbalance between the effects of paternally and maternally expressed genes on
brain development results in either an extreme paternal (autism) or maternal brain
(schizophrenia). In this paper their conceptual model is discussed and criticized
since it presupposes an incoherent distinction between observable physical and
hidden mental phenomena. An alternative model is discussed that may be more
fruitful for investigating the possible role of imprinted genes in the development of
social behaviour. The development of crying and reactive crying and behaviours
necessary for collaborative action are discussed as a promising research area for
understanding the effects of imprinted genes.
Keywords Genomic imprinting  Kinship theory  Theory of mind 
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Introduction
Genomic imprinting is the phenomenon that the expression of an allele in the
current generation depends on whether the allele was present in a sperm or egg
during the previous generation. It was discovered about 20 years ago and has since
then been a major research topic. At ﬁrst it was studied within the ﬁelds of
molecular and evolutionary biology; nowadays it is studied within the ﬁelds
of neuroscience and psychology as well since imprinted genes are involved in
brain development (for a review, see Wilkinson et al. 2007). Studies have shown
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Badcock and Crespi (2006, 2008) have advanced the hypothesis that autism and
schizophrenia are caused by imbalanced genomic imprinting in the brain. They
hypothesize that paternally expressed genes favour the development of what they
call mechanistic cognition, while maternally expressed genes favour the develop-
ment of mentalistic cognition. Perturbations in neural pathways modulated by the
products of imprinted genes, cause according to Badcock and Crespi autism or
schizophrenia. Badcock and Crespi have assembled a massive amount of data to
underpin their hypothesis. Yet interesting as their papers are, their hypothesis
remains elusive, since the data they have discussed do not conﬁrm nor disconﬁrm
their ideas. One problem is that there is a lack of clear data about the role of
imprinted genes in brain development. Another problem is that their model may be
elusive because of conceptual incoherence.
Concepts determine what makes sense and therefore delineate the logical space
within which facts are located. If concepts are misused or used nonsensically, then
this will introduce conceptual incoherence in a conceptual framework. Hypotheses
developed within the conﬁnes of an incoherent framework may not be hypotheses at
all that can be tested in experiments. In this paper I will discuss the conceptual
model developed by Badcock and Crespi and argue that their model suffers
incoherence. I will discuss an alternative conceptual model that is more interesting
for framing hypotheses about autism and schizophrenia (and about the possible role
of imprinted genes in their aetiology). Discussing conceptual problems will, I hope,
provide a clearer picture of what interesting problems are worth pursuing in future
theoretical and empirical studies.
Understanding other minds
I take as a starting point for my discussion the conceptual framework developed by
Badcock in a book chapter titled: ‘Mentalism and mechanism; the twin modes of
human cognition’. In this paper Badcock (2003) discusses the difﬁculties
ethologists, behaviorists, and evolutionary biologists had with the ‘mental domain’.
These scientists made a distinction between the observable, physical domain and
unobservable, mental domain and doubted whether a scientiﬁc approach to the
mental domain is possible. For example the evolutionary biologist George Williams
‘had no inclination to deny the mental realm’, yet was ‘inclined to delete it from
biological explanation, because it is an entirely private phenomenon, and biology
must deal with the publicly demonstrable’ (Williams 1992, p. 4). According to
Badcock most ethologists, behaviorists and evolutionary biologists disregarded the
mental domain for the methodological reasons discussed by Williams.
The tide turned according to Badcock after the ‘discovery’ of—what Premack
and Woodruff (1978) have called—a theory of mind (ToM), i.e. the ability to apply
mental predicates to humans and other animals. The presence of ToM in humans
and other ‘higher’ animals shows according to Badcock that ToM is the product of
evolution. ToM has according to him been selected since ToM enables creatures to
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mental phenomena are not publicly observable, has apparently already been
‘solved’ during the course of evolution, for animals possess a selected ability (i.e. a
ToM) that enables them to understand (and to construct predictions about) the
mental states of con-speciﬁcs (and the mental states of members of other species).
Consequently, if the theory of mind evolved as a separate module in the brain/mind,
then the problem arises which brain and cognitive structures or processes enable
‘higher’ animals to develop a ToM. The ‘discovery’ of ToM is for that reason used
by Badcock to explore new avenues of research into the mind.
Badcock distinguishes two modes of cognition (corresponding to two forms of
behaviour and two modules in the brain). He makes a conceptual distinction
between ‘mechanistic cognition’, i.e. interpreting and explaining the world in terms
of (simple) mechanical models without using mental concepts, and ‘mentalistic
cognition’, i.e. explaining and understanding the inner life of others with the help of
an acquired theory of mind. The way an individual acquires a ToM is
understandable in terms of ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes. ToM is
acquired through maturation of the brain and learning, and the capacity to use a
ToM has been ‘acquired’ by the human species through variation and selection
processes. Whether children possess a ToM is determined through studying their
ability to solve so-called false-belief tasks (such as the well-known Sally and Ann-
task). Since 3–4 year-old children are able to solve such a task, developmental
psychologists have argued that children at this age have developed a ToM.
Interestingly, children with autism appear to lack a theory of mind (or, to be more
precise, the development of a ToM is in children with autism retarded). Hence these
children have problems with ‘interpreting’ other’s intentions, beliefs and emotions.
This explains according to Badcock why they fail to understand social-emotional
behaviour depending on ‘mentalistic cognition’ and are hardly able to enter social-
emotional interactions. If one explains autism in terms of the opposition between
‘mechanistic and mentalistic cognition’, then children with autism perceive the
social world as if they are behaviorists or ethologists since they possess only the
‘mechanistic mode of cognition’. Badcock quotes Baron-Cohen (1995) to illustrate
this idea: ‘Lacking a theory of mind is in one sense akin to viewing the world as a
behaviorist’. Interestingly, this opposition between ‘mechanistic and mentalistic
cognition’ has been advanced by individuals with autism too. Temple Grandin is a
well-known example. She has stated that, as an autistic person, she lacks the
‘mentalistic mode of cognition’ which is according to her characteristic for the
human species. Based on ideas of MacLean (his well-known yet contentious ideas
about the evolution of the tripartite human brain), Grandin has advanced the
hypothesis that the part of the brain that is responsible for ‘mentalistic cognition’
has recently been ‘added’ to the phylogenetically older, animal brain (Grandin and
Johnson 2005). Since the development of this newly ‘added’ part is disturbed in
autism, children with autism ‘revert’ to the older ‘animal brain’ responsible for
‘mechanistic cognition’. She assumes that children with autism use this part of the
brain more intensively than normal people and this explains according to her why
children with autism develop ‘mechanistic cognition’ better. This illuminates
according to Grandin why some children with autism have exceptional skills.
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several uniquely human features mediated by the neocortex, such as language,
cognitive capacity and complex social interaction (…), but it often also entails
concomitant gains in mechanistic and perceptual skills that Grandin describes as
characteristic of hyper-specialized animal cognition’.
A paternal and maternal brain
Research on mono- and dizygotic twins and on the inheritance of autism and
schizophrenia in families has shown that these disorders have, in part, a genetic
cause. Subsequent research into possible genetic causes has shown that these
disorders are associated with single nucleotide-variations; so-called copy number
variations (segments of DNA ranging from 1 kilobase to several megabases which
are also described as small chromosomal mutations like deletions, duplications, and
translocations); disturbed expression of imprinted genes; and disruptions of
epigenetic inheritance. It is an objective of molecular neuroscience to unravel the
effects of these genetic variations on brain development.
It is probable that disrupted expression of imprinted genes is involved in the
aetiology of some cases of autism and schizophrenia. Yet there is no evidence that
imprinted genes are involved in most cases. Badcock and Crespi have advanced the
bold hypothesis that most cases are caused by mutations that disturb developmental
pathways modulated by imprinted genes. Hence they assume that imprinted genes
are the key to understanding of what goes wrong in autism and schizophrenia. They
use an evolutionary perspective, i.e. the kinship theory of genomic imprinting, to
explain why humans are vulnerable to disruptions in these pathways. Kinship theory
can according to them help us to understand why mutations, causing perturbations
in pathways modulated by imprinted genes expressed in the brain, result in two
related yet opposing forms of psychopathology. The ‘hypomentalistic brain’, typical
for autism, is according to them caused by disrupted development resulting in a shift
towards the ‘mechanistic brain’, while ‘hypermentalistic’ cognition, typical for
schizophrenia, is caused by a shift towards the ‘mentalistic brain’. Schizophrenia is
according to them the prototypical example of the ‘hypermentalistic’ disorder, since
individuals with schizophrenia have delusions and hallucinations (which cannot,
according to their deﬁnitions, be perceived with a ‘mechanical brain’). This raises
the question as to why disruptions in pathways modulated by imprinted genes cause
two sister-disorders. The answer is according to Badcock and Crespi that mutations
cause a disturbed balance between what they call the paternal and maternal brain
culminating in either a ‘hypo-’ or a ‘hypermentalistic’ brain. Based on experiments
done (and ideas developed) by Keverne c.s. they have argued that there is a tug of
war going on in the brain between paternally and maternally expressed genes. The
evolution of this genetic conﬂict is according to them understandable if the shift in
the regulation of maternal behaviour is taken into consideration that has occurred
during the evolution of mammals.
Keverne (2001a, b) has pointed out that in the early mammals maternal
behaviour was largely controlled by the neuroendocrine system. As mating and
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mammals regulated by hormones and neural systems that ‘translated’ the
environmental conditions into appropriate behaviour. However a shift occurred
during the evolution of later mammals. In ‘higher’ animals like primates sexual
behaviour and maternal behaviour have been ‘emancipated’ from the neuroendo-
crine mechanisms. In the case of the human species, the development of a larger
neocortex enabled females according to Keverne to develop motivated behaviour
to occur at will such that maternal afﬁliation can take place without pregnancy
and parturition. The development of maternal behaviour associated with an
enlarged neocortex evolved according to Keverne in social groups based on
matrilineal inheritance. It led to the evolution of an ‘executive brain’ appropriate
for volitional maternal behaviour (planning, caring, teaching, etc.). Since brain
studies on chimeric mice (that are mixtures of normal cells and cells that contain a
diploid set of either maternal or paternal genes) has shown that cells with paternal
genes play a critical role in development of the hypothalamus, while cells with
maternal genes are important for the development of the neocortex and the
striatum (Allen et al. 1995; Keverne et al. 1996), Keverne distinguishes a paternal
and maternal brain. He assumes that maternally expressed genes (from now on
MEGs) contribute to the development of a maternal brain involved in executive
functions, and that paternally expressed genes (PEGs) contribute to the develop-
ment of subcortical brain structures.
Badcock and Crespi have used these ideas of Keverne for explaining autism
and schizophrenia. In their kinship model they assume that the contribution of the
father to the raising of a child is minimal compared to that of the mother: she is
the major provider of care both during prenatal and early postnatal stages. Hence
the father can only rely on his genes: they are the primary means for him to affect
the behaviour of his child. Badcock and Crespi expect paternally-derived genes to
promote ‘selﬁsh’ behaviour at the expense of the mother and sibs. This explains
according to them why PEGs contribute to the limbic system (this system includes
in their view the hypothalamus) since this system modulates basic drives,
appetites, and emotions. What they call ‘mechanistic cognition’ is, therefore,
conceived as an extension of ‘selﬁsh’ behaviour modulated by PEGs expressed in
the limbic system. However, how ‘mechanistic cognition’ is understandable as an
extension of ‘selﬁsh drives’ is left unexplained. Since the mother is the major
provider of care and therefore can exploit her role during nurturing, Badcock and
Crespi expect that maternally derived genes have an interest in ‘building a cortical
brain capable of integrating mental activity in the greater interests of her whole
family’ (Badcock and Crespi 2006, p. 1011). Hence they assume that MEGs
contribute to the development of ‘mentalistic cognition’ by promoting the
development of the neocortex. The explanation they have developed for autism
and schizophrenia is now easy to understand: they assume that there are several
causes for an imbalance between the effects of PEGs and MEGs on brain
development resulting in either an extreme paternal brain (lack of social,
mentalistic cognition: autism) or an extreme maternal brain (exaggerated
‘mentalistic cognition’ leading to schizophrenia).
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Badcock and Crespi contrast two parts of the brain: the neocortex, which is
responsible for ‘mentalistic cognition’ and which enables children to develop a
ToM, to make decisions, to formulate thoughts and believes, etc. And the
subcortical parts which regulate and modulate drives, sensations and emotions, and
are responsible for ‘mechanistic cognition’ (conceived as a cognitive extension of
these drives, sensations, and emotions). They assume, presumably, that the cortex
does different things than the subcortical parts. For instance: subcortical parts can
regulate behaviour (like instincts and drives) through neuro-endocrine mechanisms,
while cortical parts enable us to develop ‘mentalistic cognition’ through for instance
synaptic plasticity involved in learning and memory consolidation. Although there
are differences between the activities of neurons in subcortical and cortical parts of
the brain, the problem arises whether these differences license us to distinguish
‘mechanistic and mentalistic cognition’. For the transmission of action potentials or
the release and re-uptake of neurotransmitters in the synapse (explicable in terms of
neuro-physiological and biochemical models), do not tell us anything about
‘mechanistic and mentalistic cognition’. How and why do Badcock and Crespi
distinguish two modes of cognition? In the following I will only discuss Badcock
and Crespi’s ideas on the evolution of ToM.
Suppose that I see that another feels pain, is jealous, or is mourning, then I am
according to Badcock and Crespi using a ToM for understanding these mental
phenomena in others. Yet if scientists observe my brain, they will observe just
neural activities or processes. What (scientiﬁc) evidence can be given that
clariﬁes or proves that my brain ‘produces’ a ToM? To see why this is a problem,
I will ﬁrst recapitulate Williams’ arguments for disregarding the mental domain
in scientiﬁc discourse (Williams 1985). Since Badcock (2003) criticized
Williams’ ‘anti-mentalism’, the question arises whether the alternative model of
Badcock and Crespi provides adequate solutions for the problems discussed by
Williams.
Williams advanced the well-known argument that mentalism (based on Cartesian
dualism) cannot be empirically tested, since there are no criteria of identity of the
mind deﬁned as an immaterial substance. We do not know how to identify the mind
as an immaterial substance, how to measure this substance, etc. ‘The power of
positive thinking has never been measured in calories per second, nor a burden of
grief in grams’ (Williams 1985, p. 22). And since there are no criteria to identify the
mind, it is senseless to say that the mind has causal powers and can, therefore,
interfere with physical processes. Mental phenomena and physical phenomena, as
Williams put it, lack a commonality. We would not know what kind of empirical
evidence someone can provide if he argues for example, that the mind causes a
voluntary movement (or that the brain ‘produces’ a ToM). For how can we
determine that an immaterial substance causes this movement if we cannot identify
this substance? Williams concluded that introducing mental concepts into the
biological domain does not add anything to scientiﬁc explanations (efﬁcient causes,
i.e. the laws of physical sciences and natural selection). Hence he proposed to delete
the mental realm from biological explanation.
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evident on logical grounds. For that amounts to saying that the mind is demonstrated
by introspection and to the thought that the mind of other animals is understandable
indirectly by analogy. Williams concluded that:
‘… the animal-mind problem is merely a special case of the other-mind
problem that has troubled philosophy ever since it began. I feel intuitively that
my daughter’s horse has a mind. I am even more convinced that my daughter
has. Neither conclusion is supported by reason or evidence’. (Ibid, p. 21)
At face value these arguments do not seem to affect Badcock and Crespi’s model.
First, Badcock and Crespi do not defend Cartesian dualism and do not suppose that
the mind interferes with physiological processes. Secondly, they do not endorse the
argument from analogy as a solution for the other-mind problem. Badcock and
Crespi assume that the other-mind problem has been solved during the course of
evolution: a ToM evolved that enables creatures to predict the ‘mental states’ of
other organisms. The challenge for Badcock and Crespi is, then, to explain which
selective forces operating on physical processes gave rise to ‘mentalistic cognition’
as a separate module (and, subsequently, how MEGs modulate the development of
this form of cognition). What evidence (in terms of the laws of physical sciences
and natural selection) for the evolution of ‘mentalistic cognition’ is at their
disposal? Since a ToM is a component of social cognition, it is usually explained in
terms of the evolution of cooperation. Hence models from game theory (like the
iterated Prisoners dilemma game) have been mentioned as possible explanations for
the evolution of ToM. I will distinguish two possibilities.
First, mathematical models developed to explain the evolution of direct
reciprocity (direct reciprocity is captured in the principle: ‘You scratch my back,
and I’ll scratch yours’) demonstrate that cooperation evolves under certain
conditions. However, since these models also apply to cooperative behaviour in
‘lower’ animals, they do not provide answers to the question as to why ToM evolved
as a distinct form of ‘mentalistic cognition’ in just ‘higher’ mammals. Secondly,
models explaining the evolution of indirect reciprocity have been mentioned as
more promising for understanding the evolution of ToM (see for example Nowak
and Sigmund 2005). These models demonstrate that cooperation evolves when, for
example, rumour about the reputation of players is spread in a population. Suppose
that C observes that A helps B. If C informs others in the population on the
reputation of A (‘A is generous’), then this information may be used by others
(called discriminators in the game) to engage cooperatively with A. Hence the
model requires the spread of information (called gossip) about the reputation of
players. Indirect reciprocity is captured in the principle: ‘I won’t scratch your back
if you won’t scratch their backs’. It is thought that language may have evolved in
populations playing games by indirect reciprocity, for players must be able to
explain and understand the information about a certain individual. If models on
indirect reciprocity are used to explain the evolution of ToM, then ToM evolved
only in a language-using creature and is, therefore, unique for the human species.
But it is not an argument in favour of ToM. Although it clariﬁes why humans
discuss information about someone’s reputation, it does not say that we need a ToM
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behavioural evidence presented to us by others (C: ‘yesterday I saw A helping B’).
Consequently indirect reciprocity does not prove that we use a ToM to predict
unobservable mental states, for C made an observation which belongs to the
publicly demonstrable (of course, C can make mistakes or may lie about A). Below I
will return to the connections between behaviour and language.
The (current) models from game theory do not solve Williams’ problem: they do
not prove that a ToM evolved as a solution to the other-mind problem. This is
presumably the reason why Badcock and Crespi opt for another possibility: the
ideas of Keverne on the ‘emancipation’ of maternal behaviour in ‘higher’ mammals.
But Keverne’s remarks about the ‘emancipation’ of maternal behaviour are merely
(re) descriptions of the differences between ‘mechanistic’ behaviour regulated by
the neuroendocrine system and ‘mentalistic’ behaviour displayed at will (he did not
develop an evolutionary explanation). Hence Keverne’s ideas do not provide us with
a criterion for identifying species that do and do not possess ‘mentalistic cognition’.
This diagnosis raises the question as to whether there are conceptual issues at stake
that blur problems.
Behavioural manifestations of the mind
Just as Williams, Badcock and Crespi assume that the mind is essentially a
private phenomenon. Williams stated that mental phenomena are not publicly
demonstrable and thought that the other-mind problem cannot be solved. Badcock
and Crespi assumed that the other-mind problem has been solved during the
course of evolution, but did not develop an explanation. But Badcock, Crespi, and
Williams did not mention an alternative solution originally developed by
Aristotle: monism. According to this conception of the mind, the other-mind
problem can, indeed, not be solved. But the reason why it cannot be solved is
according to Aristotelians that there is no problem to be solved. The other-mind
problem is according to Aristotelians a non-problem arising only within the
conﬁnes of the incoherent, Cartesian (or crypto-Cartesian) framework (see Hacker
2007 and Smit 2010a, for a discussion of the differences between the (crypto)
Cartesian and Aristotelian framework). If the alternative Aristotelian conception
of the mind is taken as a starting point for investigations, then the other mind-
problem does not arise for the simple reason that the minds of others are publicly
observable. Moreover, within the Aristotelian framework other problems can be
formulated that are far more interesting for prospective investigations. I will ﬁrst
brieﬂy discuss why the mind is publicly observable and will then answer the
question what the alternative conception of the mind teaches us about autism and
schizophrenia.
In contrast to the Cartesian and crypto-Cartesian conception of the brain/mind,
Aristotelians argue on logical grounds that the application of mental predicates to
others is based on behaviour. We use behavioural manifestations of the mind as
criteria for the application of these predicates, for ‘mental phenomena’ are
expressed in behaviour. For instance: when we observe children or chimpanzees
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muscles and subsequently develop the prediction, derived from a ToM, what the
invisible ‘mind states’ of the boy and the chimpanzee are. We see their facial
expressions and, hence, observe the manifestations of their minds. If we want to
explain to others what we perceive, we can mimic the facial expressions and can
explain the context in which these expressions are displayed, i.e. play. Hence the
criteria for applying mental predicates are behavioural, for ‘similar expression’
takes faces together in a quite different way from ‘similar anatomy’ (Wittgenstein
1980, par. 1068).
Darwin (1965[1872]) already noted that the expression of emotions is publicly
demonstrable. They can be identiﬁed by observers, we can point to a certain facial
expression if we want to explain an emotional expression, and we can make a
photograph or a drawing of an expression which can be used as samples (or
paradigms) for identifying similar expressions of emotions in others. Ethologists use
these samples, further classiﬁed in an ethogram, when they are investigating animal
behaviour. Ekman used pictures of emotional expression in order to study whether
primary emotions are universally recognized (Ekman et al. 1969; Ekman and
Friesen 1971). Of course, the use of samples in the case of expressions of emotions
differs from the use of samples of, for example, chemical substances or anatomical
structures. Except from instinctive behavioural expressions in infants, the meaning
of expressions becomes in older children circumstance-dependent. Older children
are able to smile at will and the circumstances indicate whether a given smile was an
expression of joy or timidity. A picture does not capture these different meanings.
Facial expressions are in older children no longer the sole criteria for identifying
someone’s emotions or moods. Hence the emotional life of older children will be
studied with other methods than through observing the instinctive expressions (or
bodily reactions) of children and animals (Kenny 1963, Chap. 2). Hence the
Fig. 1 Drawing of the facial expressions of a boy and a chimpanzee during play (from Van Hooff 1972)
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displayed at will grow out of instinctive behaviour.
Instinct as precursor of the mind
It has been noted by evolutionary biologists like Weismann, and ethologists like
Lorenz and Tinbergen, that newborn animals display behaviour instinctively, i.e.
unhesitatingly and spontaneously. For example Weismann described instinctive
behaviour as follows: ‘All around we can see that animals know how to use their
parts or organs in a purposeful manner: the duckling swims at once upon the water;
the chicken which has just been hatched from the egg pecks at the seeds lying on the
ground; (…) and the predatory wasp requires no instruction to recognize her victim,
(…) she knows how to attack it, to paralyse it by stings, and then hesitates not a
moment as to what she has to do next (…)’ (Weismann 1983[1904], vol. 1, p. 141).
According to Weismann, these instincts guide animals towards ends without having
any consciousness of these ends. However, when we say that animals ‘know’ how to
use the limbs of their body, we do not mean that instincts inform them how to do
this. Weismann (Ibid, p. 146) quoted Lloyd Morgan who wrote in Habit and instinct
about the pecking behaviour of chicks: ‘It does not pick at the seeds because instinct
says to it that this is something to be picked up and tested, but because it cannot do
anything else’. Hence instinctive behaviour is according to Weismann displayed
without reasoning. If instincts were inherited habits (and amenable to reason), as
Lamarck and others had argued, than there should be evidence of the possession of
‘that degree of intelligence which would have induced the variation in the previous
habit, that is, in manner of movement’ (Ibid, p. 155). However, since instinctive
behaviours are displayed stereotypically and without hesitation, this showed to
Weismann that they are at ﬁrst performed without reasoning (cf. Smit 2010b). In
‘higher’ animals instinctive behaviour can according to him be modiﬁed or inhibited
by intelligence. In humans instinctual behaviour transforms into intentional
behaviour. Weismann discussed breastfeeding as an example. The suckling of a
baby is at ﬁrst an instinct: the child seeks about with its mouth. Yet if the sucking ‘is
continued into the second year of life, as not infrequently happens in the southern
countries of Europe’, it is an example of primitive intentional behaviour since the
‘child knows exactly why it wants the breast’ (Weismann 1983[1904], vol. 1, p.
143). The child can express its bodily sensations verbally and can ask for the breast
if it is hungry. It no longer seeks the breast instinctively but acts out of a bodily
desire, i.e. hunger or thirst. And if it acts out of a desire, the child learns to refrain
temporarily from satisfying the desire.
Since instinctive behaviours are at ﬁrst displayed without preceding learning
processes, it is assumed that they are largely innate and, hence, can partly be
explained in terms of the laws of the physical sciences and natural selection during
the early stages of development. Instinctive behaviours can be described as a
concatenated series of movements. They resemble reﬂexes since instinctive
behaviour can, just as a reﬂex, be triggered by a single stimulus. For instance: a
baby seeks about with its mouth and this instinctive behaviour is triggered by a
812 H. Smit
123(internal or external) stimulus. The concatenated series of movements end with,
what ethologists like to call, a consummatory act. The baby starts to suckle as soon
as it has found a nipple. So in contrast to the (crypto) Cartesian conception, the
Aristotelian conception of behaviour emphasizes the goal-directness of adaptive,
instinctive behaviours as the beginning for the development of later ‘mental
behaviour’. The advantage of the Aristotelian conception of the mind is that it
explains the rise of complex goal-directed behaviour and intentional behaviour as
extensions of instinctual behaviour. Aristotelians do not assume a distinct, invisible
mental domain. I will elaborate the development of mental phenomena out of
instincts and ﬁrst will use sensations and emotions as an illustration.
The instinctive emotional and sensational behaviours displayed by children have
a (species-) characteristic facial expressions, bodily postures, and vocal expressions.
For instance: if an infant is in comfort or discomfort, he or she will display a
characteristic facial expression (like smiling) or will start to cry. If one-year-old
children are taught a language or pick up words and sentences from adults, they add
linguistic expressions to these natural behaviours. In stead of displaying a facial
expression they can say: ‘I feel pain’ or ‘I feel anxious’. In the case of the sensation
pain they learn to add to their natural pain-locative behaviour (of clutching the part
that hurts) verbal indications of pain location (e.g. ‘my head hurts’, ‘I have hurt my
ﬁnger’); in the case emotions children learn what appropriate objects of the relevant
emotions are (for example they learn to answer the question: ‘What are you
frightened of?’). Like the original behavioural expressions, these linguistic
utterances are expressions of emotions and sensations themselves. However, these
learnt extensions of natural behaviour create new possibilities for communication
about emotions. If a child learns to use a language, it will be able to answer the
question why it is angry and what the object of its anger is. Whether crying is an
expression of discomfort, pain or fear is therefore, in certain circumstances, no
longer confusing for parents: if a child has pain it can say where the pain is located,
and if it is anxious, it will refer to an object of fear (‘a scary dog’). Hence it is able
to specify the location of pain or give reasons for its emotion, for it can explain that
a dog bites, and, hence, why it wants to run away. Of course, if the dog is a very
friendly one, an adult can explain to the child why the fear is unwarranted.
The point to notice is that these learnt extensions of instinctive behaviours are not
based on (introspective) observations which are privately accessible only to the
owner of the mind (and are, as a corollary, only understandable by observers if they
possess a ToM). For the learnt extensions of instinctive behaviours are not based on
knowledge. They are essentially groundless (they are not grounded in empirical
observation or in reasoning), for we cannot ﬁrst identify an emotion or sensation in
our brain or mind. Hence ﬁrst person present tense utterances like ‘I am anxious’
cannot refer to an object visible to an ‘inner eye’: introspection is not an inner
observation. When someone is saying: ‘I feel fear’ he is not feeling or observing his
fear somewhere in his mind or brain (as someone may feel with his ﬁngers that the
penny in his pocket is rough or smooth). The avowal is a verbal expression of an
emotion just as the original instinctual, facial expression. It is, for that reason, called
a new form of emotional behaviour. Of course, it is possible that someone is not
angry or anxious when he says that he is. But then he is insincere: he is lying and,
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someone has learnt to pretend to be angry or jealous and presupposes the ability that
creatures have learnt to display these behaviours at will.
Intentions, beliefs, and schizophrenia
First-person present tense utterances are groundless, for it makes no sense to ask for,
or to give evidence for these utterances. This not only holds for sensations and
emotions, but also for beliefs and intentions. Someone’s belief tells us something
about what is credible according to him; his intentions about his future behaviour. If
I say that I have the intention to go to Amsterdam next week, I am telling something
about what I will do in the future. I have knowledge of the future since I know what
I will do because I have formed an intention. Yet saying that ‘I know what I intend
to do’ is not a cognitive assertion based on (empirical) evidence (of course,
expressing the intention that I will take a train presupposes knowledge about train
schedules). Expressing or declaring an intention and adding ‘I know …’ is only a
way of revealing that one has made up one’s mind, or of an expression of a
concession, or of that one has ﬁnally made a difﬁcult decision. Ignorance, doubt,
and lack of (empirical) knowledge are, therefore, logically excluded. For example:
when someone says ‘I do not know what I intend to do’, then he does not express
ignorance, but indecision. Similarly, when someone says ‘I believe that p’, this is a
confession based on what he thinks that may be the case, i.e. p. Although
information about p is relevant for this utterance, he is expressing his belief, i.e. he
makes clear what he thinks is credible and is, perhaps, important for him.
Since intentions and beliefs, just like sensations and emotions, are expressed in
nonverbal and verbal behaviour, we, as observers, can directly observe what
someone is up to. When someone is crying or laughing we do not ﬁrst observe
mechanical movements and, after we have learnt to use a ToM, make predictions
about an unobservable inner life. Likewise we do not infer with the help of a theory
of mind what someone’s beliefs or intentions are when he says that he beliefs p or
plans to take a train next week. Since we express our beliefs and intentions, it is
mistaken to suggest (as Williams did) that our inner life is not publicly observable.
The problem of the hidden inner life and, hence, the other mind problem, arises only
within the incoherent (crypto) Cartesian framework. In the following I will argue
that the symptoms of schizophrenia are likewise publicly observable.
Save in cases of lying or self-deception, one does not believe p and
simultaneously assert that is not the case that p. For a rational creature does not
believe something that he knows to be false. To recognize that something is
incredible is a reason for ceasing to believe it. Suppose I am told by sincere people
that a certain belief or thought is false, then I will stop believing it. But suppose that
I cannot stop believing or thinking it. In that case I cannot say that ‘I still believe
that p for good reasons’, but will perhaps say that ‘I cannot help thinking, believing,
imaging that p’. In the worst case I am haunted by a thought and in the grip of a
delusion or fantasy. For example I may haunted by the thought that someone is
following me. If so, then the haunting thought may be a symptom of paranoia. This
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Another criterion is that someone hallucinates (hears voices, etc.). Hence we can
describe the so-called ‘mentalistic disorder’ schizophrenia in terms of behavioural
manifestations and do not need to make an incoherent conceptual distinction
between observable movements and an invisible mind.
Disrupted formation of intentions may also be a symptom of psychopathology.
Suppose that I form the intention: ‘I will go to Amsterdam tomorrow’. If someone
replies with ‘No, you will not; there are no trains tomorrow’, then I will change my
intentions. But suppose someone utters this intention but often, without changes in
train schedules, does not take a train. If we observe this person, we will ask him the
next time when he utters this intention: ‘Are you sure?’ If he replies with: ‘I hope so,
unless something happens to change my mind’, we will be puzzled by his answer
although we now understand why his expressions of intentions are unreliable for
predicting his future behaviour. It raises the question why this person cannot
develop ﬁrm intentions. Does he have a weak will or is he confused about his wants
and plans? Now take the opposite case: suppose that someone forms an intention,
but it is obvious that this intention would be a mistake for him (there are good
reasons for him not to do what he intends to do). Yet suppose that he insists on
doing what he has decided to do. Since his plans are impervious to reason we will
conclude that he is in the grip of a compulsion. He is not, as Hampshire (1965) has
explained at length, a free person, for he cannot respond to reason (see also Hacker
2005). Obsessive compulsive behaviour is, for example, characteristic of girls with
anorexia nervosa who display obsessive-compulsive slimming behaviour. The
insistence on sameness in the case of autism reminds one of it too.
Emotions, caring, and autism
The logic of emotions is to a certain extent the opposite of the logic of intentions,
since emotions are traditionally referred to as passions. They are not actions or
things one does or chooses, but things one feels. One cannot order a person to feel
an emotion, as one can order someone to perform an action. Likewise one cannot
decide to love or hate, to be angry or to feel jealous. One may be in the grip of or
full of an emotion. Hence when I am saddled with a passion, I am not the author of
my emotion, for I do not decide after deliberation or decision to feel an emotion
(and am therefore angry or anxious). By contrast: I am always the author or designer
of my intentions, for I form my intentions. These patent differences between
emotions and intentions have been used to argue that emotions belong to
‘mechanistic cognition’ and are the opposite of ‘mentalistic cognition’. And since
emotions appear to belong to the passive, it has been argued emotions are the carrots
and sticks of genes (Haig 2006). As a corollary, a distinction is made between our
‘mechanical emotional life’ and ‘mentalistic cognition’. Hence it is postulated that
PEGs may affect child behaviour through their emotional life. Autism is then a
disorder caused by a disturbance in the development of ‘mentalistic mode of
cognition’. Hence one of the problems left unexplained within this conceptual
framework is how this cognitive development relates to our passive emotional life
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sticks of genes and are partly constitutive for the development of ‘mechanistic
cognition’. On the other hand ToM is a component of the ‘mentalistic mode of
cognition’. I will discuss an alternative view.
Children express emotions in their behaviour. Later they learn what the
appropriate objects of emotions are. They learn which dangerous animals or
situations are objects of fear, they learn that worthy achievements are objects of
pride, and learn that offensive remarks are objects of anger. Hence they learn to use
words to express their feelings towards objects and learn to use these words in their
descriptions of the emotions expressed by others. This does not mean that emotional
responses can no longer be triggered by a single stimulus. This was already noted by
Darwin. While visiting the Zoological Gardens, Darwin noticed that he was unable
to control his response to the attack of a snake: ‘I put my face close to the thick
glass-plate in front of a puff-adder in the Zoological Gardens, with the ﬁrm
determination of not starting back if the snake struck at me; but, as soon as the blow
was struck, my resolution went for nothing, and I jumped a yard or two backwards
with astonishing rapidity. My will and reason were powerless against the
imagination of a danger which had never been experienced’ (Darwin 1965[1872],
p. 38). The results of Darwin’s experiment are explicable in terms of the well-
known model of LeDoux (1998): there are two pathways in the brain, i.e. a cortical
and subcortical pathway. The presence of the subcortical pathway makes clear why
Darwin reacted mechanically when confronted with the fearful object. His
experiment shows that, although our emotional life is an extension of innate
emotional responsive dispositions and tendencies, the bodily responses and facial
expressions are not fully replaced by a ‘cognitive emotional life’. But with
maturation, emotional responses come to a much greater degree under the control of
reason and reﬂections. For that reason one can discover later in life that emotional
responses, mediated by the subcortical pathway, are unwarranted and, hence,
disappear. In these cases we refer to the object in order to explain why the emotional
response was unwarranted. Suppose that a child is lying in bed and hears the noise
of a stair. The noise may frighten the child since it associates the noise with a
burglar. Yet the child is afraid of a burglar (the object on an emotion) and if the
child notices that the noise is produced by a cat, the emotion will cease since the
fear is no longer warranted.
When emotions get appropriate objects children become able to act out of an
emotion (emotions become a motive for acting): they develop so-called emotional
attitudes. These emotional attitudes are, in contrast to innate responses, thought-
dependent. Hence, humans can change their attitudes in response to changes in the
relevant properties of the object of their emotion. I am no longer proud if my son has
cheated during the examinations, I am no longer jealous if someone convincingly
explains to me that my belief that my girlfriend is dating another is wrong. Hence
although emotions initially belong to the passive (they are not, like intentions,
formed at will), older children are able to control their emotions and act out of
emotions.
An interesting topic is the development of caring. Caring is not a uniquely human
attribute, yet the caring behaviour of language-using creatures is richer than that of
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about the well-being of his girlfriend now but may also be worried about happens to
her next Friday (when she has to visit a doctor) and send her once and again a SMS
to support her. Note that his actions are goal-directed:: if he acts out of love or care,
then he can specify the (future) objectives of his actions. However, since cognition
is an essential part of the emotional life of the boy, his emotional life may change.
When the girlfriend ceases to matter to him, he will cease to feel anything about her.
His emotions disappear and he will care less about her. This example shows that,
through manifesting his emotions, the boy showed what is (no longer) important for
him. The manner in which the object of his emotion (his girlfriend) matters to him
reveals why. Hence the thoughts and beliefs of emotional attitudes are important for
understanding someone’s emotional life.
Patients with lesions in their orbitofrontal cortex do not act out of care. They
appear to be indifferent as they do not feel emotions and do not pursue goals related
to caring about others. In this respect they behave like autistic persons who,
probably due to an early neuro-developmental disturbance, do not develop an
emotional life in which caring is a motive for entering emotional interactions. If the
development of the ability to apply mental predicated to others is studied in children
with autism when they are older than four, then it is noticed that they have problems
solving false belief-tasks. Yet this is the outcome of a developmental trajectory.
There are many other symptoms discernable during earlier stages (lack of pretend
play, problems with recognizing emotions, etc.). Hence it is possible that the so-
called cognitive disorder is rooted in a disturbed affective development.
Whatever the early precursors of autism are, the analysis given suggests that the
idea that autism is caused by a disturbed development of ToM is mistaken. For there
is no such thing as a theory of mind and, consequently, imprinted genes did not
evolve for their contribution to the development of a theory of mind. Moreover, a
strong focus on a cognitive developmental trajectory culminating in ToM disregards
the possible contribution of a disturbed affective developmental trajectory in the
aetiology of autism. This is an oversight since there is evidence that imprinted genes
contribute to this trajectory.
Genomic imprinting and the development of social behaviour
If imprinted genes, for conceptual reasons, cannot contribute to the development of
‘mentalistic cognition’ yet affect the development of social cognition and
communicative behaviour, what could an alternative hypothesis be?
Weismann discussed the transition from (instinctive) sucking to intentional
behaviour (‘asking for the breast’). There is evidence showing that PEGs affect the
instinctive suckling behaviour of babies (Plagge et al. 2004). Given these ‘selﬁsh’
effects of PEGs, kinship theory predicts the evolution of maternally-expressed genes
that counteract these effects of PEGs and contribute to mechanisms and behaviours
that enhance inclusive ﬁtness. One can hypothesize that MEGs beneﬁt from an
earlier transition to intentional behaviour, since an earlier transition increases the
chance that the mother can get pregnant and makes children less demanding (Smit
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development of skills necessary for collaborative actions, since these actions are
needed for a just distribution of food among siblings (under parental control). By
contrast: paternally-derived genes beneﬁt from behaviours that will help an
individual to compete with siblings. I will brieﬂy discuss the possibility that
imprinted genes affect the development of crying, reactive crying and the
development of collaborative action.
The affective development of children begins with simple emotional expressions
like crying and smiling. It is thought these instinctive behaviours of a newborn are
adaptive behaviours since they evoke maternal care (for a critical discussion, see
Blumberg and Sokoloff 2001). Yet newborn babies also cry when they hear another
infant cry. Reactive crying was found in 2- and 3-day-old babies by Simner (1971)
and he noted that it was not the loudness of the cry that evoked the response. This
ﬁnding has been replicated by Sagi and Hoffman (1976) in 1-day-olds. They showed
that the reactive cry is indistinguishable from the spontaneous cry of an infant who
is in actual discomfort. Martin and Clark (1982) later demonstrated that infants do
not react as much to the sound of their own cry. This ﬁnding has been replicated by
Dondi et al. (1999). One can argue that this innate response to the cry of another of
the same species is an adaptive response since it increases the chance that the child
receives maternal care. In a simple model, reactive crying increases the chance that
the child will receive maternal care at the expense of another. Kinship theory, i.e.
Trivers’ ideas on parent-offspring conﬂicts (Trivers 1974), predicts that this
response to another’s cry may have been subject to a genetic conﬂict. If imprinted
genes are involved, then one can hypothesize that PEGs promote reactive crying.
Six month-old infants do no longer respond ‘mechanically’ to another’s cry: they
appear to respond to the distress of another only after the other displayed several
instances of distress. Moreover the cry displayed by a 6-month-old is different from
a newborn’s cry: the infant looks sad and puckers his lip before starting to cry, just
as infants do when they are in actual stress. The response of a one year-old is similar
to the response of a 6-month-old but their cry is now accompanied by whimpering
and silently watching or staring. As soon as children are able to crawl and later
become self-moving, walking creatures, they actively seek comfort in their mother’s
lap (cf. Hoffman 2000).
Pro-social behaviours (instrumental helping, concern for others, etc.) replace
reactive crying after about 12–14 months and increase during the second and third
year, although the base rates are low (Svetlova et al. 2009). Since these behaviours
are not instinctive responses but examples of primitive intentional actions, there are
various forms of helping (ﬁrst patting and touching, and later kissing, hugging,
giving physical assistance, getting someone else to help, and giving advice).
However, the fact that pro-social behaviours replace reactive crying does not mean
that children do no longer behave ‘selﬁsh’. For example two- and three-year olds
sometimes help when they witness a distressed other, but do not help if they cause
the distress (cf. Zahn-Waxler et al. 1992). Hence it is unlikely that MEGs evolved
that cause (the development of) certain pro-social behaviours. How then can MEGs
contribute to the development of collaborative actions among siblings and the
mother? One possibility is that MEGs contribute to (learning) behaviours necessary
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directed behaviour, for these behaviours help to coordinate actions in a family (Smit
2009). It is interesting to note that the development of behaviours necessary for
collaborative action begins around the age when children develop milk teeth and
breastfeeding is extended with supplementary food. Whether these behaviours and
skills are also a prerequisite for the development of empathic behaviour and cause,
in the case of disturbed gene expression, autism, is a topic for future studies.
Conclusion
I have used in this paper the traditional conceptual distinction between the (crypto)
Cartesian framework (used by Badcock and Crespi) and the Aristotelian framework
(used by, among others, Darwin and Weismann) to explain how two conceptions of
the mind result in different hypotheses about the possible effects of imprinted genes
on brain and behavioural development. Badcock and Crespi have argued that there
are two modes of cognition: mechanistic and mentalistic cognition. They have
argued that schizophrenia (and the Prader-Willi syndrome) is explicable as an
extreme of the mentalistic mode of cognition, and autism (and the Angelman
syndrome) as an extreme of the mechanistic mode of cognition. There are several
causes of these disorders, but Badcock and Crespi have suggested that the
pathogenesis is similar in most cases since the different causes all affect the same
brain pathways or structures in the brain. These pathways or structures are,
according to Badcock and Crespi, regulated or modulated by imprinted genes. There
is, however, no evidence that imprinted genes are selected because of their alleged
(inclusive) ﬁtness-effects on the development of mentalistic and mechanistic
cognition. I have argued that it is doubtful whether we can investigate their model
since it suffers conceptual incoherence.
According to the alternative Aristotelian conception of the mind, imprinted genes
may affect the development instinctive behaviours and verbal and nonverbal
behaviours growing out of instincts as the result of maturation and learning.
Weismann discussed the transition from (instinctive) sucking to acting out of a
sensation (‘asking for the breast’) as an example. There is evidence that imprinted
genes are involved in suckling and the transition to intentional behaviour. Hence it
is also possible that imprinted genes affect the transition from (reactive) crying to
primitive, intentional behaviours, since these behaviours have different effects on
the inclusive ﬁtness of paternally and maternally derived genes. One can
hypothesize that PEGs contribute to more ‘selﬁsh’ behaviours like crying and
reactive crying, while MEGs modulate the development of behaviours and skills
necessary for joint action in the (extended) family. This hypothesis explains why
PEGs are involved in brain structures and processes in the hypothalamus regulating
instinctive behaviours, while MEGs modulate brain processes such as long term
potentiation involved in learning skills.
I have argued that the (crypto-Cartesian) model advanced by Badcock and Crespi
is mistaken and have advanced an alternative hypothesis. Although it is unknown
whether this hypothesis holds, it is known that that the lack of expression of
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PEGs) and Angelman syndrome (lacking the effects of MEGs) causes disruptions in
crying and in the development of communicative behaviour. Hence a study of early
development in children with Prader-Willi and Angelman syndrome will provide
some answers.
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